Abstract-Online
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of intelligent mobile phones, online social networks (OSNs) have become the most popular society in the visual world. Several online social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat have been a part of our daily lives, and many cannot live without them. People share their personal thoughts, activities, arrangements, and information of daily life via different OSNs. Also, more and more people probably share their activities in the forms of similar posts during different OSNs because of the various scopes of friends and followers. People are even able to use a feature in Facebook to automatically publish updates to their Twitter accounts simultaneously [1] . The similar function can also be designed in other social networks, for example, Tumblr users can share the pictures or information to Twitter and Facebook accounts. Most of the web pages have the functioned button at the bottom to allow viewers to share this page into various OSNs. All of these make different OSN accounts for one person exhibit high similarities.
Unfortunately, high prosperity in OSNs gives rich soils for different kinds of spams. Spammers who aim to advertise their products or post victim links are more frequently spreading their malicious activities via different OSNs. Reports show that nearly 10% of tweets in Twitter are all spam [2] , and Facebook usually blocks 200 million malicious actions every day [3] . Even if all companies developed approaches to limit the activities of spammers, spam volume is rapidly growing more than users' actions.
II. RELATED WORK
Many researches have concentrated on this area to find efficient methods to identify spam, and are especially focused on the classification of different spam features. X. Hu, et al. focused on a content and network information framework for social spammer detection [4] . X. Jin, et al. proposed a GAD [5] clustering algorithm to deal with the scalability and real-time detection challenges. B. Markines focused on six features at the post level, resource level, and user level to specify the spam [6] . H. Gao, et al. analyzed spam accounts of social networks to identify the percentage of malicious wall posts, compromised accounts, and accounts created for the purpose of spamming [7] . C. Grier, et al. tested the usefulness of URL blacklists to intercept the spreading of Twitter spam via the link feature [9] . M. Bosma, E. Meij, and W. Weerkamp proposed a framework combined with user features and spam reports to detect spam [12] . J. Song, S. Lee, and J. Kim, classified the spams based on the relationships connection features between accounts in Twitter [14] . K. Thomas, et al. analyzed different features and behaviors via the largest spam campaigns on Twitter accounts [15] . S. Long, Raymond Y.K. Lau, and C.X. Yin designed a new methodology combines word-, topic-, and user-based features to stem social spam in YouTube [18] . Y. Zhu, et al. used a user-activity count matrix to encode the users' social activity in Renren [17] . Basing on spam profile features, K. Lee, J. Caverlee, and S. Webb proposed a honeypot-based approach for spam detection in MySpace and Twitter [16] . K. Thomas, et al. found that it can spare 70% of victims by preventing the spread of compromise in 24 hours [8] . J. Caverlee, L. Liu, and S. Webb proposed a reputation-based trust aggregation framework to test spam in MySpace [13] .
However, prior research mainly concentrated on spam detection in one particular social network like Twitter or Facebook, and they paid less attention to the detection across different OSNs. Several researchers have focused in this area. De Wang, et al. designed a framework called "SPADE" to deal with spam in different social networks and webs via one framework [10] . It can specify different types of spam-like links or contents in various OSNs via particular models.
As activities between different OSNs contain more connections, online social networks will develop more interactions with others. Therefore, when one spam link, content or spammer attacks one social network, it is possible to appear in other social networks with similar actions. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the methodology and the datasets that this work is based on. We first show the compositions of these datasets and then analyze the data to classify as spam and ham. We then introduce our methodology about the procedures of classification and effects of similar features in different spam detection. In section 4, we describe how the detection works and present the classification results. We conclude the whole work in section 5.
III. METHODOLOGY

A. Background
In this section, we introduce the background information about Facebook OSN and Twitter OSN, different policies of APIs in OSNs, and the datasets we crawled.
1) Twitter OSN:
Twitter is one of the most popular OSN in the world, and Twitter users can use tweets, hashtags or mentions for sharing information and activities with their followers. The tweets allow users to share a link or update with words up to maximum 140 characters; by using @mentions users can directly address anyone they want; hashtags allow users to update following with several keywords or group activities.
Twitter API allows certificated users to search information via different ways: by using keyword, the API can reach information using this keyword via the whole world tweets; by using locations, users can search other users' posts and information, mainly focusing on one city or place; by using follow, users can search all tweets, retweets, and replies that are from one user, etc.
2) Facebook OSN: Facebook is the most popular OSN in the whole world, and it has more than one billion active users in the world. Billions of daily posts form the largest social society in the visual world. The most popular and successful feature of Facebook is its platform including wall posts, fan pages, and tags. These allow normal users to interact with their favorite celebrities and friends by sharing information and activities. They also can use tags to address their friends and events during their post (similar to the @mention in Twitter).
Facebook API allows certificated users to access various kinds of account information in its networks, but it has a few limitations: people can access the public accounts and open groups without external authority, but when collecting the information of private accounts, they cannot get any information without private account's authorities. Facebook API only allows users to use feeds, posts, and other parameters to access data.
B. Datasets
Suitable labeled datasets are crucial for the whole classification procedure. As our designed research objective, we aim to use different datasets that are gathered from different OSNs but share most similarities in the contents, topics, or users. That means we need to get the datasets from different OSNs but should have similar keywords or activities. At the same time, all data should appear in OSNs during the same period, considering that if data is collected during different periods, the original classification frameworks of OSNs will delete most of the spam automatically.
We decided to collect data via the same keyword or topic to make this data as related as possible. Therefore, as more spams appear in OSNs connected with celebrities and famous activities, we collected one dataset via API of Twitter in a keyword ("Taylor Swift") from June 2015 to August 2015, and gathered data of one open group ("World of Taylor Swift") through API of Facebook. Then we labeled these data and normalized them into two datasets.
We labeled the data and specified them into spam and ham based on the pointed URL links, actual contents in the tweets or posts, and the official identifications to the accounts. Specifically, when one tweet or post contains the URL link which point to a fishing, content unrelated advertising, or porn webpage, we defined it as spam. Also it is definitely a spam when the official network shows this post or account as an illegal activity or account. All data were saved in csv file and consisted of contents and categories (spam or ham). Here are more details about these two datasets:
Twitter Spam Dataset (TSD): We collected dataset whose keyword was set as "Taylor Swift" in Twitter from June 2015 to August 2015. After our labeling and normalizing, we got this dataset that consists of 1937 spam tweets and 10942 ham tweets.
Facebook Spam Dataset (FSD): We collected data through the open public group in Facebook which was named as "World of Taylor Swift" from July 2015 to August 2015. We labeled and normalized them into one dataset that contains 1338 spam posts and 9285 ham posts.
C. Analysis of Datasets
We analyzed these two datasets via various perspectives. We omit all nonsense and useless nouns, verbs and pronouns. They share some similarities in these words that interacted with products advertising, photo, and videos, etc. Table II shows the most frequent tweets and posts in the spam of Twitter and Facebook. After the analysis, we discovered that most spam tweets and posts consisted of several words and links that point to fishing pages or products advertisements, or they consisted of several useless or nonsense words. These show that spam posts and tweets are always in similar formats. 
D. Classification Strategy
We suppose to explore the influence of spam in one OSN to another, we don't aim to show how great performance of detection only around one dataset. So we chose 10% original data to do the training work so that we can maintain the maximum independence and testability of posts in one social network, at the same time, it is more intuitional and beneficial to show the influence of spam related with same topics in other social network to the spam detection in that social network. The strategy of process is as follows: 
IV. EVALUATIONS
A. Original Classification
We did all the classifications in Weka [11] , which had been one of the standard tools in data mining and machine learning. It contains various classification and clustering algorithms like Naïve Bayes, J-48, Random Tree, Random Forest, etc. We combined Filtered Classifier to train and test with various classify algorithms and used String To Word Vector to process natural language in Weka. We also use precision, F1-Measure as criteria to evaluate the classification performance.
The relations of the true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) are shown in Table III .
Here are the definitions of Precision of spam, F1-Measure, Recall of spam and accuracy based on above terms: p y
We use the training datasets to train classification algorithms and then use the algorithms to test the remaining test datasets, we use several different cluster algorithms to detect the spams and calculate the accuracies, we also use one of the most efficient classifiers to classify the test dataset in various percentage. The results of TSD are shown in Table  IV . Table IV shows the performance of five classifiers. We can see that most of them show reasonable performances with accuracies all over 90% but lower recalls. That means these classifiers gained better performance in the ham tweets but poor performance in the spam tweets. Among them, tree classifiers (Random Forest) show better performance than others. Random Forest obtains the best performance with nearly 95% accuracy and a precision as 98.5%. Logistic shows the best performance in spam detection with its recall higher than others, but its final accuracy (94.1%) is a bit lower than Random Forest. Table V shows the influence of training set's size to the final classification results. When 20% data is used for training, the final accuracy is up to 0.962, and the false positive is as low as 0.208. Only a small part of spam achieves high accuracy in the whole spam detection. Table VI shows the results of FSD which uses several classifiers for detection. The results show these classifiers obtain accuracies all higher than 90% but recalls are all lower than 90%. The tree classifiers (Random Forest, J48) show better performances compared with others. Random Forest shows the best performance with the accuracy close to 0.977, a nearly 0.844 recall and precision is high as 0.928. We can also see that Bagging shows the best performance in recall which is as high as 0.875, but it shows lower performance in precision and accuracy. In Table VII , it introduces the performance of how training dataset influences the test performance. As the size of train dataset increases, the total accuracy is growing. When 20% of the data was used for training process, the final accuracy reached 98.4%.
B. Classification Mixed with Spam from Other OSNs
We then used the TSD and FSD to continue the mixed classifications. Throughout this part, we modified the detection methodology. We combined the original datasets with the spams from other OSNs. When we split the TSD into training and test sets, we combined spam of Facebook with the Twitter dataset as Twitter Spam Mixed Dataset (TSMD), and then we used it to train classifiers and do the detections. Also, we got the Facebook Spam Mixed Dataset (FSMD) where we combined spam of Twitter with the Facebook dataset.
For classifying spam and ham compared with former detection, we recalculated the probabilities for all contents. Now we introduce the parameter (Revised Probability), defined as follows: In the above formula, is the probability of ith content during the classification of original data sets, is the probability of ith content via the classification combined with outside spam. and are ratios for the spam or ham. We mainly focus on the result of spam classification of new datasets, so when calculating the probabilities of new spam which was marked as ham by original classifications, we set and as 0.8 and 0.2, because we specify ham mainly based on the original datasets.
From Table VIII , we can see after combining with spam of Facebook, the final precision is nearly 1.4% to 2.6% better than before. For the recall, all five classifiers gain more 15% rise than before. Naïve Bayes acquires a most growth in recall which up to19.8%. Random Forest shows the best whole performance which accuracy is up to 97.3% and nearly 16.1% growth in recall. In Figure 1 , for Random Forest, the final number of spam has declined from 601 to 297, achieving a 51% decrease. The spam of Logistic declines nearly 54.8% from 560 to 253. The spam of Random Tree and Logistic separately decrease by 53.8% (569 to 263) and 54.8% (560 to 253). Also for Naïve Bayes and BayesNet, they have decreases 25.4% (from 674 to 503) and 35.2% (733 to 475). Table IX shows the result of FSMD. We can see that when combined with spam of Twitter, all classifiers show increases in the accuracy and recall in various degree. Random Forest shows the best performance with its accuracy is up to 98.9% and recall is nearly 85.5%. It gains an 11.1% increase in recall compared with the original classification. Logistic gains a most rise in recall which is up to 16.3%. Random Tree and Bagging have 1.4%, 1.2% increases in accuracy and 13.1%, 9.6% rise in recall. J48 obtains a 0.3% growth in accuracy and 3.4% growth in recall. Fig. 2 In this paper, we introduce a new perspective to distinguish between spam and legitimate contents in Twitter and Facebook. We collected two datasets through their APIs and analyzed their content information. We used several traditional classifiers such as Random Forest, Random Tree, J48, Logistic, and Naïve Bayes to evaluate these two original datasets. Random Forest shows the best performance with a nearly 94.7% accuracy and 66% recall for Twitter Spam dataset, and 97.7% accuracy and 84.4% recall for Facebook Spam dataset. We then combined the spam of one social network with another to enhance the training work for classifications. As we expected, the spam related with same topics in another OSN lead a positive influence in the spam detection in this OSN. The new classifications with mixed spams from another social network show better performances in both precision and false positive. The results show that Random Forest obtains the best performance with the accuracy up to 97.3% and 83.1 % recall for the TSD, 98.9% accuracy and 97.5% recall for FSD, and nearly 51% and 71.2% decline in the number of spam. The results demonstrated that similar spam in one online social network benefits the spam detection in another social network. Our future research will focus on analyze more inner-connections and activities of spammers in different OSNs. We plan to build a multi-function framework that could efficient classify various types of spam across different OSNs.
